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We study the eﬀect of secondary markets on equity-linked life insurance contracts
with surrender guarantees. The policyholders are assumed to be boundedly rational
in giving up their contracts, and a proportion of policyholders will access the sec-
ondary markets instead of surrendering the contracts to the insurance company. We
formulate the valuation problems from both the insurance company’s and the policy-
holders’ perspectives and characterize the contract values by deriving the respective
pricing PDEs. Comparative statics are derived indicating the eﬀect of the level of the
policyholder’s rationality and secondary market characteristics such as accessibility
and competition on the contract values. The pricing PDEs are solved numerically via
the Crank-Nicolson scheme to study the implication of the inclusion of a secondary
market. We show that a secondary market generally increases the risk borne by the
insurance company and the policyholders proﬁt from the secondary market only when
the secondary market is suﬃciently competitive. Furthermore, we derive the neces-
sary condition for the existence of a fair contract in this context and study the eﬀect
of the secondary market on fair contract design.
Keywords:equity-linked life insurance contracts, surrender guarantee, bounded rational-
ity, fair contract analysis, secondary market
JEL: G13, G22, C65
11 Introduction
The world market for life insurance contracts is huge with a premium volume of 2,332 billion
US dollars in 2009.1 Statistics show that roughly 50% of the contracts in most developed
countries are terminated (surrendered) early.2 As the surrender guarantees oﬀered by the
primal insurers are usually far less than the contract values themselves, secondary markets
have been developed, which allow the policyholders to sell their policies to third parties
at relatively better prices. In the US and the UK, which are the world’s largest and the
world’s third largest life insurance markets respectively, these secondary markets have a
long history,3 and have been growing in the last few decades.4 In other countries like Japan
or Germany, secondary markets for life insurance contracts have been established recently
and a substantial increase in the trading volume on these markets could be observed.5
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀect secondary markets have on the valuation of equity-
linked life insurance contracts with surrender guarantees. On the valuation of such contracts
without secondary markets there exists a large literature. The key problem of valuing these
contracts is to model the surrender behavior of the policyholders. Most literature assumes
surrender to be induced purely by endogenous reasons and considers the premature contract
termination as an optimal stopping problem. The contract valuation is hence conducted
within the American-style contingent claim framework. Prominent examples are Grosen
and Jorgensen [21, 22], Bacinello [2, 3], Bacinello et. al. [4]. Recently, there is also the
argument that policyholders surrender contracts for both endogenous and exogenous reasons
and surrender behavior should be modeled with both of these surrender reasons in mind.
Contract valuation in this spirit can be found for example in Albizzati and Geman [1],
DeGiovanni [20] and Li and Szimayer [26].
While the literature on equity-linked life insurance contracts with surrender guarantees
is large, the impact of secondary markets on these contracts is rarely examined. In the
1SwissRe [30].
2Gatzert [17], Bundesverband Verm¨ ogensverwalter im Zweitmarkt Lebensversicherung (BVZL) e.V. [9]
3For the UK it can be traced back to 1844, for the US to 1911. See BVZL e.V. [9].
4For the US, BVZL gives a volume of 2 million US dollar in 1990, 12 billion US dollar in 2008, and
estimates a traded volume of 30 billion dollars for 2017. On the UK secondary market, 20,000 contracts
with a price volume of 200 million GBP have been traded in 1996, which increased to 200,000 contracts
with a price volume of 500 million GBP in 2003. See Gatzert [17].
5For example, the price volume of traded policies in Germany raised from e50 million in 2000 to e1.4
billion in 2007. The total volume of terminated contracts increased from e8.2 billion (2000) to e13.8 billion
(2009). See BVZL e.V. [9].
2literature we only ﬁnd a few articles on secondary markets either in a specialized setting or
for other contract types. Gatzert [17] compares the major secondary markets, evaluates the
market potential and points out possible eﬀects on these markets, but does not address the
quantiﬁcation of these eﬀects. Gatzert, Hoermann, and Schmeiser [18] simulate surrender
proﬁts in a model of heterogeneous insurance holders, and analyze the eﬀect of asymmetric
surrender behavior on the secondary market. Giacolone [19] reviews the secondary market
for life insurance contracts with viatical transactions6 as do Doherty and Singer [15], who
focus on welfare aspects of secondary markets in this case. Equity-linked life insurance
contracts are also popular contract types on secondary markets, and we aim with our study
to shed some light on this issue.
We address the valuation of equity-linked life insurance contracts with surrender guar-
antees in the presence of secondary markets in two steps. First, we formulate a ﬁnancial
market augmented for mortality risk. In this market we consider an equity-linked life insur-
ance contract with a surrender option, following Li and Szimayer [26], see also Stanton [29],
Dai et al. [13], and DeGiovanni [20]. As the second step we extend the setup and add as a
new feature the secondary market. For doing so, the surrender strategy of the policyholder
is adapted to also allow for the sale of the contract on the secondary market.
More precisely, we formulate the ﬁnancial market model consisting of a riskless asset and
a risky asset that is the reference fund for the contract. The ﬁnancial market is extended
to also include mortality risk, that is the death time of the insured individual, which we
assume to admit a deterministic mortality intensity. Consequently, the mortality risk is
unsystematic and can be diversiﬁed for a large pool of similar contracts. Then the surrender
options and the secondary market are added. The policyholder can now walk away from the
contract either by exercising the surrender option, i.e. by giving back the contract to the
insurance company, or, by selling the contract to a third party on the secondary market. To
model this we need to specify two objects, the time when the contract is given up and the
mode of giving up the contract. The time when the contract is given up by the policyholder
is deﬁned by a random time with a stochastic intensity that is bounded from below and from
above. The lower bound represents giving up the contract for exogenous reasons due to the
6Viaticors are policyholders with sharply reduced life expectancy due to severe illness. The ﬁrst sec-
ondary markets for life insurance products have been established in the US for people with drastically
reduced life expectancy, in particular persons inﬂicted by HIV (See Giacolone [19]).
3policyholder being exposed to ﬁnancial constraints, e.g., liquidity needs caused by ﬁnancial
distress. The intensity increases to its upper bound whenever the policyholder is ﬁnancially
better oﬀ from ending the contract compared to continuing the contract. Therefore, the
upper bound limits the optimal timing for giving up the contract and the setup is referred
to as bounded rationality, see, e.g., Stanton [29].
The two ways of giving up the contract, either by exercising the surrender option or
by selling the contract on the secondary market, are assigned to the representative policy-
holder by randomization. The probability that the representative policyholder can access
the secondary market is therefore a parameter capturing the representative policyholder’s
awareness of the secondary market. Once the secondary market is accessed and the con-
tract is sold to a third party we assume that the contract buyer is a ﬁnance professional
exercising the surrender option ﬁnancially optimal. Then the contract value is given by the
price of the corresponding American claim in the presence of diversiﬁable mortality risk.
The price for selling the contract on the secondary market thus cannot exceed the price of
the corresponding American option. As well, the price cannot drop below the surrender
value, otherwise the policyholder would rather exercise the surrender option than selling
the contract on the secondary market. The bargaining power of the both parties deter-
mines how the proﬁt that arises from the policyholder’s access to the secondary market is
shared. In the end the policyholder can compute the expected early termination value of
the contract and compares this value to the continuation value. Based on the speciﬁcation
of the behavior of the policyholder and the respective payoﬀs the pricing PDEs is derived
for the contract value from the perspective of the representative policyholder. Further, the
stochastic representation of the contract value is provided using Feynman-Kac. The proﬁt
sharing between the policyholder and the potential buyer of the contract on the secondary
market leads to a value diﬀerential between the policyholder and the insurer. The value
from the perspective of the insurance company has to account for all costs incurred by the
contract. Using this fact and the behavior of the representative policyholder as input the
pricing PDE for the contract value from the perspective of the insurance company is derived.
Again, the stochastic representation of the contract value is provided using Feynman-Kac.
The contract values from both perspectives, the policyholder’s and insurance company’s,
are then analyzed for their sensitivities when changing relevant parameters. This is then
4followed by a numerical analysis where the pricing PDEs are solved by the Crank-Nicolson
scheme. The analysis highlights the eﬀect of the inclusion of the secondary market on the
surrender behavior of the policyholder. By varying the parameters describing the secondary
market and also the rationality parameters we provide a risk analysis for the insurer. This
is followed by an investigation of the welfare for the policyholder and a fair contract anal-
ysis. Overall, we ﬁnd that the policyholder may only proﬁt partly from the secondary
market. Although the introduction of the secondary market may increase the payout to
the policyholder, it is not necessarily beneﬁcial for him if the welfare increase is associated
with the increase of the premium. Generalizing from the representative policyholder to two
groups of policyholders, one uninformed and one informed of the existence of the secondary
market, we demonstrate that the secondary market is proﬁtable for no policyholders when
the policyholders have no suﬃcient bargaining power on the secondary market. If, on the
contrary, the secondary market is competitive enough, the informed policyholders proﬁt
from the secondary market while the uninformed policyholders bear the costs incurred by
it. For the insurance company the secondary market brings a challenge in regard to the
risk management of the contracts. If the secondary market is introduced at a sudden, the
premiums charged before may not be adequate to support the hedging strategies of the
insurance companies. Further, the projected cashﬂows from the contracts may alter due to
the surrender options being exercised optimally by the contract buyers on the secondary
market, ultimately aﬀecting the insurer’s liquidity management.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3
the pricing of the insurance contract is carried out. Comparative statics are presented in
Section 4. Numerical results, in particular, the risk analysis for the insurance company, the
welfare analysis for the policyholder and the fair contract analysis are provided in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In order to price equity-linked life insurance contracts, a model for both the ﬁnancial and
the insurance market is necessary. The model presented in this section is based on Li and
Szimayer [26], but extends their market model by a secondary market on which policyholders
5may sell their life insurance contracts. The decision behavior of the policyholder of choosing
between holding the contract, exercising the surrender option or to sell the contract on
the secondary market is a further key component. The model for the decision process is
motivated and formalized for a representative policyholder.
2.1 Financial and Insurance Market
The ﬁnancial market is deﬁned on a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,G,F,P) and consists of a
risk-less money market account with price process B and risky asset with price process S.
The risky asset is assumed not to pay any dividends and plays the role of the reference fund
for the equity-linked life insurance contract studied in what follows. We ﬁx a time horizon
T > 0 and deﬁne the dynamics of the price processes by
dBt = r(t)Bt dt, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and B0 = 1, (1)
dSt = a(t,St)St dt + σ(t,St)St dWt , for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and S0 = s > 0. (2)
The deterministic function r denotes the short rate, the functions a and σ > 0 are drift and
volatility of the risky asset, and W is a Wiener process under the real world measure P.
Both price processes are assumed to be Markovian, i.e. they do not depend on past events,
only on the present state. The ﬁltration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T of the ﬁnancial market is generated
by the Wiener process, i.e. the Wiener process reﬂects all the information available on the
ﬁnancial market.
By deﬁnition the ﬁnancial market is arbitrage free and complete. In other words, there
exists a unique equivalent martingale measure Q ∼ P under which the dynamics of the risky
asset satisfy
dSt = r(t)St dt + σ(t,St)St d ˆ Wt, (3)
where ˆ W is a Wiener process under Q with d ˆ Wt = dWt + a−r
σ dt, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The insurance market is modeled by two random times τ and λ potentially ending the
ﬁnancial contract. The time τ refers to the death time of an individual aged y at time
t = 0 when the contract is signed. The time λ refers to the time when the policyholder
6decides to give up the contract either by exercising the surrender option or by selling
the contract on the secondary market.7 The jump process associated with τ is H with
Ht = 1{τ≤t}, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, and generates the ﬁltration H = (Ht)0≤t≤T. The hazard rate
of the random time τ (or the mortality intensity) is denoted by µ and is assumed to be a
deterministic function. Under this assumption, the mortality risk can be diversiﬁed over a
large pool of policyholders. The jump process associated with λ is J with Jt = 1{λ≤t}, for
0 ≤ t ≤ T. It generates the ﬁltration J = (Jt)0≤t≤T. The hazard rate of the random time λ
is denoted by γ, and is also called the surrender intensity.8 By introducing the random
time λ, and correspondingly, the surrender intensity γ, we can actually represent a large
family of insurance contracts. For the degenerate case where γ = ∞, the insurance contracts
are European style. When γ is allowed to take ﬁnite values, the policyholder can walk away
from the contract. In contrast to the mortality intensity µ, the surrender intensity γ is
not deterministic but depends on the monetary rationality of the policyholder in making
surrender decisions by comparing the contract value and the surrender value. Since the
contract value and eventually also the surrender value are linked to the risky asset S, γ is
assumed to be F-measurable. The exact form of γ will be speciﬁed in Section 2.2.
The nature of equity-linked life insurance policies is that they are linking the ﬁnancial
market and the insurance market. To model the information on the linked market, the
ﬁltrations F, H and J need to be combined. Bielecki and Rutkowski [6] give an account
on the technicalities to combine these ﬁltrations, see Section 7, pp.197. We give a brief
summary of their key results relevant to our situation.
Starting under the original probability space (Ω,G,P) we ﬁrst specify the enlarged ﬁltra-
tion G = (Gt)0≤t≤T carrying all the relevant information by Gt = Ft∨Ht∨Jt, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Recalling that F is the ﬁltration generated by the Wiener process W we assume that W
remains a Wiener process for the enlarged ﬁltration G. The processes H and J both admit
intensities µ and λ that are F-adapted. Now, we additionally assume that µ and λ are the
respective G-intensities, i.e. the processes ˆ MH = ( ˆ MH
t )0≤t≤T = (Ht −
  t∧τ
0 µ(u)du)0≤t≤T
and ˆ MJ = ( ˆ MJ
t )0≤t≤T = (Jt −
  t∧λ
0 γu du)0≤t≤T are both G-martingales, and that joint
7In case the contract is sold on the secondary market the contract is still alive. However, the policyholder
is no longer holding the contract.
8Surrender is here understood as both ways the policy holder can walk away from the contract, i.e. by
exercising the surrender option and by selling it on the secondary market.
7jumps of H and J occur with zero probability, i.e. P(τ = λ) = 0.




       
Gt
= E[Y |Gt] P − a.s., (4)
where Y is a GT-measurable random variable with P(Y > 0) = 1 and EP[Y ] = 1. Accord-
ing to Bielecki and Rutkowski [6], Proposition 7.1.3, p. 201, it has the following integral
representation
ηt = 1 +
 
]0,t]
ηu−(ϕud ˆ Wu + ξ
H







where ϕ, ξH and ξJ are G-predictable processes.
Set ϕ = −a−r
σ and ξH = ξJ = 1, then by Proposition 7.2.1. in Bielecki and Rutkowski [6],
ˆ W in the risk-neutral dynamics of the risky asset in (3) is also Q-Brownian motion on the
enlarged ﬁltration G. Further, µ and γ are the intensities of τ and λ under the equivalent
martingale measure Q and ﬁltration G. Thus, valuation under the risk-neutral measure Q
and on the extended ﬁltration G is possible and carried out in Section 3. However, prior to
carrying out the valuation we have to model the yet unspeciﬁed intensity γ governing the
likelihood of the policyholder walking away from the contract.
2.2 Decision Behavior of the Representative Policyholder
In our setup the policyholder of an equity-linked life insurance contract with surrender
guarantees can choose to continue the contract or to end the contract either be exercising the
surrender option or by selling the contract on the secondary market. The related valuation
problem could be addressed as a standard contingent-claim pricing problem assuming a
rational agent in a perfect ﬁnancial market, however, we follow a diﬀerent approach.
We develop the decision process of a representative policyholder facing ﬁnancial con-
straints, e.g., liquidity needs caused by ﬁnancial distress. Our representative agent is not a
ﬁnance expert and may not always realize that he is better oﬀ from giving up the contract
and instead continues holding the contract. In case he opts to walk away from the contract
he can exercise the surrender option and give back the contract to the insurance company for
8the prespeciﬁed surrender value or he can sell the contract to a third party on the secondary
market. Here, we also assume that the representative policyholder is not fully rational in
his decision. The two ways of ending the contract are assigned by randomization. The
probability that the representative policyholder accesses the secondary market is therefore
a parameter capturing the representative policyholder’s awareness of the secondary market.
Once the secondary market is accessed and the contract is sold to a third party we assume
that the contract buyer is a ﬁnance professional exercising the surrender option ﬁnancially
optimal. Then the contract value is given by the price of the corresponding American claim
in the presence of diversiﬁable mortality risk. The price for selling the contract on the
secondary market thus cannot exceed the price of the corresponding American option. As
well, the price cannot drop below the surrender value, otherwise the policyholder would
rather exercise the surrender option than selling the contract on the secondary market.
The bargaining power of the both parties determines how the proﬁt that arises from the
policyholder’s access to the secondary market is shared. In the end the policyholder can
compute the expected early termination value of the contract and compares this value to
the continuation value.
The decision process is now formalized. We are given an equity-linked life insurance
contract written on S with maturity T. Denote by V C the contract value from the perspec-
tive of the representative policyholder and by L the surrender beneﬁt. The third party on
the secondary market potentially buying the contract is assumed to be an agent in a perfect
ﬁnancial market with no frictions and access to all relevant information. Consequently, the
buyer on the secondary market exercises the surrender option ﬁnancially optimal and the
contract value is then the price of the corresponding American-style option in the presence
of mortality risk and is denoted by V Am. The probability that the representative agent can
access the ﬁnancial market is p ∈ [0,1], both under P and Q.9 This is captured by the
random variable X that is independent of GT and is taking the value 1 with probability p
(access to secondary market) and the value 0 with probability 1−p (no access to secondary
market).10 The bargaining power of the representative policyholder on the secondary mar-
9This invariance of the probability is based on the underlying assumption that the associated risk is
unsystematic and hence diversiﬁable.
10Formally, we have to enlarge the ﬁltration G to also include the information generated by the process
(X 1{λ≤t})0≤t≤T revealing X at λ.
9ket is given by κ ∈ [0,1] and quantiﬁes the fraction of the additional value created by the
secondary market that remains with the policyholder.
Suppose that at time t the representative policyholder gives up the contract, i.e. λ = t,
and suppose further he is able to access the secondary market, i.e. X = 1. Since the
representative policyholder could give the contract back to the insurance company, he re-
quires at the least the surrender beneﬁt L to sell the contract on the secondary market.
The contract value for a potential buyer on the secondary market is the price of the cor-
responding American-style claim in the presence of mortality risk with price process V Am,
with V Am ≥ L. This is the highest possible price oﬀered on the secondary market. The
added value created by the secondary market is thus V Am − L. Now, using the bargaining
power parameter κ ∈ [0,1] the price oﬀered for the contract on the secondary market is
(1−κ)L+κV Am = L+κ(V Am −L). Taking into account the randomization given by X,
the expected contract value when giving up the contract at t is then
(1 − p)L(t) + p(L(t) + κ[V
Am
t − L(t)]) = L(t) + pκ(V
Am
t − L(t)). (6)
Now, we specify the surrender intensity γ of the representative policyholder for ending the
contract following the approach Li and Szimayer [26] that is dating back to Stanton [29].
The representative policyholder tends to terminate the contract for exogenous reasons, e.g.,
caused by ﬁnancial constraints, at rate ρ ≥ 0. In case the expected proceeds from ending
the contract in (6) exceed the continuation value of the contract V C then the contract




















The intensity diﬀerence ρ − ρ can be interpreted as a the level of rationality of the repre-
sentative policyholder.
103 Contract Valuation
Given the market model and the policyholder’s decision behavior, the pricing of the in-
surance contract is now possible. This is carried out ﬁrst from the perspective of the
representative policyholder to obtain V C. Then the value from the perspective of the insur-
ance company V I is derived using as input the behavior of the representative policyholder
captured by γ. The diﬀerence in the contract values is the premium (or cost) for introducing
the secondary market.
We consider the case of single premium contracts, the results can be extended to the
case of continuous premiums without much diﬃculty. The payoﬀ structure of the insurance
contract is divided into three parts: the beneﬁt at maturity, denoted Φ(ST), the beneﬁt at
death Ψ(τ,Sτ) and the beneﬁt if the contract is terminated early, given by L(λ).11 The
payoﬀ functions considered here are



















L(λ) = (1 − βλ)P (1 + h)
λ . (10)
Here, α is the fraction of the premium guaranteed to yield the minimum rate g, usually
smaller than the risk free rate,12 P the single premium and k the participation coeﬃcient
specifying the degree to which the policyholder participates in gains of the risky asset
underlying the insurance contract. Mostly, g = gd and k = kd, i.e. death is not penalized
by the insurer.13 Surrendering the contract early is penalized however, captured by the time
dependent function β. In most cases, β is a function decreasing in time, aiming to punish
early surrender over continuation of the contract. Bernard and Lemieux [5] state that for
example in Canada, by law the cash surrender value cannot be lower than the guaranteed
minimum rate, i.e. g ≤ h.14
11The payoﬀ structure is taken from Bernard and Lemieux [5] and also employed by Li and Szimayer [26].
12See [5], p. 446. Note that by g < r early surrender may be attractive if the stock market does not
perform well, so that investing in the money market account will provide a higher return that is risk-less.
13See [5], p. 446.
14See Bernard and Lemieux [5], p. 447.
11Remark 1. The value of an American option in the presence of mortality risk then describes
the maximal possible value of the contract and assumes that the contract holder is facing no
ﬁnancial constraints in an eﬃcient market. On {t < τ ∧ λ ∧ T} the value of the American
option is V Am
t = vAm(t,St) where vAm : [0,T] × R+ → R satisﬁes the free boundary value













∂s2 (t,s) + µ(t)Ψ(t,s)
− (r(t) + µ(t))v
Am(t,s),
with constraint vAm(t,s) ≥ L(t) on [0,T) × R+ and terminal condition vAm(T,s) = Φ(s),
for s ∈ R+.
3.1 Representative Policyholder’s Contract Value
In the following, we derive the pricing PDE for the contract value from the perspective of
the policyholder V C. Our derivation extends Li and Szimayer [26] to allow for a secondary
market. The basis of the derivation remains the balance law as stated by Dai et. al. [13]. The
expected return of the contingent claim speciﬁed by the insurance contract has to equal the
risk free rate under the risk-neutral measure as this is a no-arbitrage condition. Contracts











On the above set, the following possible cases may happen:
1. The conditional probability that death occurs over (t,t + dt) while surrender does
not is µ(t)dt(1 − γtpdt − γt(1 − p)dt) = µ(t)dt. Note that the decision to access a
secondary market is irrelevant here.
2. The conditional probability that death does not occur over (t,t+dt) while surrender
does and the secondary market is used is γtpdt(1 − µ(t)dt) = γtpdt.
3. The conditional probability that death does not occur over (t,t+dt) while surrender
12does and the secondary market is not used is γt(1 − p)dt(1 − µdt) = γt(1 − p)dt.
4. The conditional probability that both surrender and death happen over (t,t + dt)
is 0 as in Li and Szimayer [26]. Again, the decision to enter a secondary market is
irrelevant, as the probability to get to a point where this decision matters is zero
anyway.














where v is a suitably diﬀerential function v : [0,T]×R+ → R. By (7) we see that γ depends
on the current continuation value V C and the expected termination payoﬀ driven by V Am.
V Am can be expressed as functions of time t and price of the risky asset s, see Remark 1,
and therefore γ can be written as a function of (t,s,v), i.e. γ : [0,T]×R+×R → R+, and set
γt = γ(t,St,v(t,St)). As given by Li and Szimayer [26] the occurrence of the event of death
changes the contracts payoﬀ Ψ(t,s) leaving a change in payment that is Ψ(t,s) − v(t,s).
Basically, the claim to receive v is lost and replaced by the payment of Ψ. Similarly, the
payment liability is eﬀected by the surrender action. The secondary market changes the
payoﬀ to be dependent on the state of the decision variable X. The change in payment
remains to be L(t) − v(t,St) if X = 0, but if the secondary market is accessed then X = 1
and the payoﬀ change is L(t)+κ[vAm(t,St)−L(t)]−v(t,St). The representative policyholder
does not know in advance whether the secondary market will be accessed or not.













+ [L(t) − v(t,St)](1 − p)γtdt + [Ψ(t,St) − v(t,St)]µ(t)dt. (13)
Equation (13) carries economic interpretation: The change in the contract’s value can be
split up in the changes in value due to the diﬀerent surrender and death events and the
15See Li and Szimayer [26].
13change in value originating in the continuation value. All these components have to equal
the risk free rate in total, since the pricing takes place under the risk neutral measure. The
expected change in the continuation value is based on ﬁltration F as, in economic terms,
the death risk process does not inﬂuence the stock prices. Expanding the increment of the
continuation value by It´ o’s Lemma gives
E



























Thus, the balance law produces








− (r(t) + µ(t) + γ(t,s,v(t,s)))v(t,s).
A further no-arbitrage condition is v(T,s) = Φ(s), for all s > 0, i.e. the value of the contract
that has survived up to maturity will be the same as the value of the payout speciﬁed for
this case. This completes the derivation of the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Pricing PDE, Representative Policyholder). For the contract value V C
given by (12) the price function v is the solution of the partial diﬀerential equation







− [r(t) + µ(t) + γ(t,s,v(t,s))]v(t,s), (15)
for (t,s) ∈ [0,T) × R+ with terminal condition v(T,s) = Φ(s), for s ∈ R+. The solution
of (15) together with Remark 1 and equation (7) then characterize the intensity γ.
In the following corollary, a stochastic representation formula of the Feynman-Kac type
is obtained:
Corollary 1 (Stochastic Representation Formula, Representative Policyholder). The value














































3.2 Insurance Company’s Contract Value
The derivation of the contract value for the insurance company is broadly similar to that for
the representative policyholder. However, there are some distinct diﬀerences. The contact
value from the perspective of the insurance company V I depends on the behavior of the
representative policyholder as described by γ. Thus γ and indirectly also v serve here as
an input parameter. Further, in case the contract is sold on the secondary market the
insurance company has to account for the full costs.
In the spirit of (12) we express the contract value V I by
V
I
t =1{t<τ∧λ}u(t,St) + 1{t=τ≤λ}Ψ(τ,Sτ) + 1{t=λ<τ,X=0}L(λ) + 1{t=λ<τ,X=1}V
Am
λ , (17)
where u : [0,T] × R+ → R is the related value function.
Proposition 2 (Pricing PDE, Insurance Company). Suppose that the contract value for
the representative policyholder is given by v and the intensity is given by γ, respectively,
both according to Proposition 1. For the contract value V I given by (17) the price function
u is the solution of the partial diﬀerential equation
0 =Lu(t,s) + µ(t)Ψ(t,s) + γ(t,s,v(t,s))(1 − p)L(t) + γ(t,s)pv
Am(t,s)
− [r(t) + µ(t) + γ(t,s,v(t,s))]u(t,s) (18)
for (t,s) ∈ [0,T) × R+ with terminal condition u(T,s) = Φ(s) for s ∈ R+.
Again, we have an immediate corollary giving the stochastic representation of the price
function.
15Corollary 2 (Stochastic Representation Formula, Insurance Company). The value of the
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The relationship between the insurance company’s value and the representative poli-
cyholder’s value is that, as expected, the insurance company’s value is greater than that
of the representative policyholder. This is made precise below and follows directly from
Corollary 1 and Corollary 2
Corollary 3. The value diﬀerence of the contract from the perspective of the insurance
company and from the perspective of the representative policyholder, respectively, can be
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Remark 2. The pricing PDE and the stochastic representation formula can be extended to
incorporate continuous premiums. Further, the constant surrender parameters ρ and ρ and
can be allowed to be functions of the time and the price of the risky asset. Then the results
are still valid under the extended setup.
In the traditional sense, an equity-linked life insurance is fair if and only if the expected
payment to the policyholder equals the premium paid by the policyholder at the initial date.
Such a fair contract does not necessarily exist if the insurer charges V I but the policyholder
is paid only V C in expectation.
Proposition 3. If a fair equity-linked life insurance contract exists on the insurance market
with a secondary market, then one of the following conditions must be satisﬁed
1) p = 0, i.e., there is no possibility to access the secondary market;
162) κ = 1, i.e., the secondary market is completely competitive;
3) (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,∞), i.e., the policyholder faces no ﬁnancial constraints and acts monetarily
rational.
Proof. From Corollary 3 we see that V I = V C if one of the above conditions is met. The
contract parameters can then be speciﬁed so that the expected payment to the policyholder
equals the expected premium paid by the policyholder at the initial date.
4 Comparative Statics
In the following, the eﬀects of changes in the model parameters are analyzed. The analysis
is restricted to the single premium case, but can be extended to the continuous premium
case, as the premium will cancel immediately when studying value diﬀerentials.
For the representative policyholder we can derive a comprehensive set of comparative
statics. The more rational the representative policyholder is, or, the less ﬁnancial constraints
he is facing, the higher is the contract value. Thus the contract value is increasing for
decreasing likelihood of exogenous surrender (ρ) and for increasing rationality (ρ). The
impact of the secondary market parameters is that the increasing probability of access to the
secondary market (p) and increasing bargaining power of the representative policyholder (κ)
result in an increasing contract value.
Proposition 4 (Comparative Statics for Representative Policyholder). For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ and
0 ≤ p,κ ≤ 1 denote by v the representative policyholder’s value function, and for the set of
parameters 0 ≤ ρ′ ≤ ρ′ and 0 ≤ p′,κ′ ≤ 1, denote the respective value function by v′, both as
given in Proposition 1. Suppose that ρ′ ≤ ρ, ρ′ ≥ ρ, and p′ κ′ ≥ pκ, then v′(t,s) ≥ v(t,s),
for all (t,s) ∈ [0,T] × R+.
Proof. The pairs (v,γ) and (v′,γ′) are solutions to the PDE (15) with respective parameters,
see Proposition 1. Consider the diﬀerence z = v′ − v. First, the boundary condition of z is
computed, i.e. z(T,s) = v′(T,s)−v(T,s) = Φ(s)−Φ(s) = 0, for all s ∈ R+. By taking the
17diﬀerence of (15) for v′ and v we obtain the PDE describing z on [0,T) × R+, i.e.















Am(t,s) − L(t)] − [r(t) + µ(t) + γ(t,s,v(t,s))]z(t,s).





























Now, A ≥ 0 implies exactly what we want to show, i.e. z ≥ 0, or, equivalently v′ ≥ v. To
establish this we analyze the ﬁrst component of A. For the case v′ > L+p′ κ′(vAm −L) we
have γ′ = ρ′ by (7). Thus (γ′ − γ) ≤ ρ′ − ρ ≤ 0 by assumption. Both factors constituting
the ﬁrst component of A are non-positive, hence their product is non-negative. For the
case v′ ≤ L + p′ κ′(vAm − L) we have γ′ = ρ′ by (7). And then (γ′ − γ) ≥ ρ′ − ρ ≥ 0 by
assumption. Now, both factors are non-negative and so is there product. It remains to
investigate the second component of A. Note that γ ≥ 0, p′ κ′ ≥ pκ by assumption, and
vAm ≥ L, to see that also the second component of A is non-negative. This ﬁnishes the
proof.
In economic terms, the above proposition states that a contract is more valuable, if the
option to surrender the contract is used “more rationally”. This means that such an insur-
ance contract has higher value compared to a second one if the number of surrenders during
periods in which it is rational to lapse the contract, is higher (i.e. surrender takes place after
a shorter period of waiting). We have a further natural interpretation of the above results
relating to the secondary market. Given all else remains constant, an increased willingness
to access a secondary market for the contract raises the value of this life insurance. Further,
a raise in the policyholder’s share of the proﬁts made through optimal exercise increases
18the contracts value also.
For the insurance company’s contract value the dependence on the parameters is complex
since the policyholder’s contract value also has an impact via the policyholder’s behavior (γ).
We can provide the following result.
Proposition 5 (Comparative Statics for Insurance Company). For 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ and 0 ≤
p,κ ≤ 1 denote by u the insurance company’s value function, and for the set of parameters
0 ≤ ρ′ ≤ ρ′ and 0 ≤ p′,κ′ ≤ 1, denote the respective value function by u′, both as given in
Proposition 2. Suppose that ρ′ = ρ, ρ′ = ρ, p′κ′ = pκ, and κ′ ≤ κ, then u′(t,s) ≥ u(t,s),
for all (t,s) ∈ [0,T] × R+.
Proof. First note that the corresponding contract values from the perspective of the rep-
resentative policyholder we have v′ = v by Proposition 1 and assumption ρ′ = ρ, ρ′ = ρ,
p′κ′ = pκ. Consequently, we have that γ′ = γ, where we have also used (7). Now, we can
apply Corollary 2 for u′ and u. Taking the diﬀerence we see that the ﬁrst two summands
cancel out and we obtain
u
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.
Observe that κ′ ≤ κ implies p′ ≥ p by the assumed constraint p′κ′ = pκ. Finally, it follows
that u′ ≥ u.
5 Numerical Analysis
5.1 Numerical Methodology
Four major steps are undertaken to solve the pricing PDEs (15) and (18) via ﬁnite diﬀer-
ences. In the beginning of the analysis, boundary conditions for the PDE are derived to
solve the problem with and without secondary markets. Then the optimal stopping values
needed in the PDEs are computed numerically via the Crank-Nicolson scheme that is set
up in the second step. Especially, when solving the pricing PDE for the policyholder the
surrender intensity has to be determined simultaneously. The methodology used to deal
with this issue is presented in step three. This allows the solution of the generalized PDE
including secondary markets in the ﬁnal step.
19First, we address the boundary conditions for the PDE given in (15). Because a grid
with the two dimensions time and price is used, three boundary conditions have to be found.
In a similar context, DeGiovanni [20] derives boundary conditions that are adapted to ﬁt
the problem under consideration. The boundary condition for maturity is already given
by Φ, i.e. an alive contract will pay out the value at maturity speciﬁed by the insurance
contract. The two other conditions are more demanding, however.
For s = 0, a suitable boundary condition of the PDE is obtained numerically. At s = 0,
the PDE given in (15) satisﬁes
0 =Lv(t,0) + µ(t)Ψ(t,0) − [r(t) + µ(t) + γ(t,0,v(t,0))]v(t,0)



















(t,0) + µ(t)Ψ(t,0) = 0,
with constraint vAm(·,0) ≥ L. These two ODEs are of the Ricatti type and can be solved
numerically by a straight-forward ﬁnite diﬀerence scheme that is omitted here.
The third boundary condition required is the one for the case s → ∞, where inﬁnity
has to be replaced by a suitable value smax in the numerical procedure. This condition is
based on a discrete approximation of the derivative of v with respect to s. For large values
of s, surrender will only happen for exogenous reasons. This boundary does not require
the operator splitting method suggested by DeGiovanni [20], as there is no interaction
of an interest rate model and the insurance value in contrast to the problem studied by
DeGiovanni. However, one insight of this paper is that the lapse rate has to be ρ, as there
are no incentive to surrender the contract for endogenous reasons. This means that the
20discretized version of the contract value for smax is given as
v(t,smax) = µ(t)∆tΨ(t,smax)e
−r∆t + (1 − µ(t)∆t)e
−r∆t 
ρ∆L(t) + (1 − ρ∆t)v(smax,t + ∆t)
 
,
where ∆t is a small but not inﬁnitesimal time step.
These three boundary conditions set up the boundaries of the discretized grid on which
the contract value can be established using the Crank-Nicolson ﬁnite diﬀerence scheme.
5.2 Analysis of Financial Implications
This section studies some examples of the contracts analysed in Section 3. In particular,
the setting of Li and Szimayer [26] is used to get numerical results that capture the eﬀect
of secondary markets for equity-linked life insurance contracts of the above type. The
following issues are to be investigated. Firstly, we study the eﬀect of the secondary market
on policyholders’ surrender behavior, which at the same time depends on the policyholders’
monetary rationality degree. Secondly, we compare the contract values with and without
a secondary market for both the insurance company and the policyholders and investigate
the impact of the secondary market for both parties. Thirdly, we conduct the fair contract
analysis from the insurance company’s perspective and call for more care in contract design
when the existence of a secondary market is not negligible.
The parametrization is speciﬁed to be identical to the one used in Li and Szimayer [26]
for comparability: The risky asset has a volatility of σ = 0.2 and S0 = 1000 as a starting
value. The interest rate is taken to be constant and equal to r = 4%. The single premium is
P = 100, and the time to maturity is T = 10 years. The percentage of the premium covered
by the guarantee is α = 0.85, while the guaranteed rates for both the ﬁnal payment as well
as for premature termination, whether due to death or surrender, is g = gd = h = 2%. The
participation coeﬃcient for gains of the underlying asset is k = kd = 0.9. The policyholder
is assumed to be forty years old when he enters the contract. The penalty function for early
surrender, β, is assumed to have the penalty rates β1 = 0.05, β2 = 0.04, β3 = 0.02, β4 = 0.01
and βt = 0 for t ≥ 5. The deterministic mortality intensity takes the form µ(t) = A+Bcy+t,
where A = 5.0758 × 10−4, B = 3.9342 × 10−5, and c = 1.1029.
215.2.1 Eﬀect of Secondary Market on Surrender Behavior
Li and Szimayer [26] have studied policyholders’ surrender behavior by developing a sepa-
rating boundary between the high and the low surrender intensities. Policyholders are more
likely to surrender the contracts (represented by the high surrender intensity ¯ ρ) when the
underlying asset has a relatively low value. While surrender events take place less likely
(represented by the low surrender intensity ρ) when the underlying asset value is relatively
high. The interest rate eﬀect, the time eﬀect and the penalty eﬀect were analyzed to ex-
plain the non-smooth increase of the separating boundary. In this section we analyze how
the separating boundary, and correspondingly the surrender behavior, is aﬀected by the
introduction of the secondary market.
As we have addressed above, the secondary market is featured by the competitiveness of
the secondary market κ and the policyholder’s access probability p. The surrender behavior
is assumed to be aﬀected by the product of p and κ in our model. Assuming that we increase
p × κ, the average surrender beneﬁt is increased, say, to ˜ L, see (6), and hence the contract
value V C increases. If the contribution of ˜ L to the contract value is very high, so that
V C ≥ ˜ L is still satisﬁed even when S is lower, we would expect the separating boundary
to move downwards. On the contrary, if the contribution of ˜ L is not high enough, the
separating boundary may stay unchanged or move upwards. The exact eﬀect of p×κ could
only be investigated numerically, which we present in Figure 1. p = κ takes the value of 0,
0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 respectively. The surrender intensity is ρ above the separating boundary
and ¯ ρ below the separating boundary.
It is clear that when p×κ = 0, we are back to the model of Li and Szimayer [26] where
a secondary market is not accessible to the policyholders. For p × κ > 0, the secondary
market comes into play. The surrender intensity in this case indicates the policyholder’s
surrender behavior either to the insurer or to the secondary market, instead of solely to the
insurer when there is no secondary market. We see from Figure 1 that compared to the
case with p × κ = 0, the ¯ ρ region is enlarged while the ρ region shrinks for all the cases
with p × κ > 0. In the ¯ ρ region, we would expect more policyholders to be more likely
to give up their contracts when it is monetarily better to do so. Since a ﬁxed proportion
(indicated by p) among these policyholders go to the secondary market, we would expect






















Figure 1: Separating Boundary for p = κ = 0 (blue), p×κ = 0.04 (turquoise), p×κ = 0.25
(yellow), and p × κ = 0.64 (red).
shrink of the ρ region indicates that fewer policyholders will give up the contracts when it is
monetarily disadvantageous to do so. Moreover, a proportional amount among them go to
the secondary market which triggers the optimal surrender later on. Both of these aspects
indicate that the insurer bears more risk when a secondary market emerges. As mentioned
in Li and Szimayer [26], the kinks displayed in all the graphs are due to the discontinuous
levels of penalties for early surrender. If early surrender is not penalized, e.g. by βt = 0
for all t ≥ 0, the graphs turn out to be smooth. This case does not alter the economic
interpretation oﬀered above in any way, however.
5.2.2 Risk Analysis for the Insurer
The separating boundary presented in Figure 1 has indicated that the emergence and the
growth of the secondary market increases the risk borne by the insurer. In this section,
we quantify the magnitude of the risk by comparing the contract values when there is and
when there is not a secondary market. Besides, we study the interaction of policyholder’s
monetary rationality with the secondary market on the contract values by calculating the
true contract values when ρ and ¯ ρ vary.
In Table 1 we present the contract values for ρ ∈ {0,0.03,0.3}, ¯ ρ ∈ {0,0.03,0.3,∞}, p ∈
23{0.0,0.2,0.5,0.8,1.0} and κ ∈ {0.0,02,0.5,0.8,1.0}. The ﬁrst row with (p,κ) = (0.0,0.0)
displays the contract values when there is no secondary market. We use it as the benchmark
to investigate the risk for the insurer caused by the secondary market. For (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,0),
the contract is actually of the European type and is hence not inﬂuenced by the secondary
market. For (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,∞), both the policyholder and the secondary market are supposed
to be able to exercise the surrender option monetarily optimally. Hence, it does not matter
who is actually to exercise it, and the secondary market does not play a signiﬁcant role in
this case either. For the other cases we always observe the increase of the contract values
whenever the secondary market is introduced.
For given (p,κ) combinations, we always observe that the contract value increases mono-
tonically with the decrease of ρ and the increase of ¯ ρ. For the insurance company, the lower
ρ is, the lower would be the probability that the policyholder surrenders the contract sub-
optimally which increases the contract value. On the other hand, the lower would be the
probability that the contract is sold to the secondary market and hence the lower is the
chance that the optimal surrender is triggered. This aspect tends to decrease the contract
value for given (p,κ). From the table we infer that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. With regard
to ¯ ρ, the higher ¯ ρ is, the higher is the probability that the contract is surrendered opti-
mally and meanwhile the higher is the probability that the contract is sold to the secondary
market. Hence, overall, a higher ¯ ρ indicates a higher contract value.
Now we further study the impact of p and κ separately. The insurer does not care about
how the proﬁts are shared between the secondary market and the original policyholder
but only the total amount of extra money which is to ﬂow out of the company due to
the existence of the secondary market. Since the access probability p determines directly
the proﬁts generated by the secondary market, we observe the monotonic increase of the
contract value with p for given κ. On the contrary, the competitiveness index κ only matters
through the decision rule of the policyholder. The behavior of the contract value with κ can
be distinguished in three cases. First, when (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0.03,0.03),(0.3,0.3), the policyholder’s
surrender decision is exogenously determined which is independent of κ. Hence, we do not
see the change of contract value with κ. Second, when (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0.03,∞),(0.3,∞), the
contract value is not inﬂuenced by κ either. Analogous to our analysis in Section 5.2.1,







(0,0) (0,0.03) (0,0.3) (0,∞) (0.03,0.03) (0.03,0.3) (0.03,∞) (0.3,0.3) (0.3,∞)
(0.0,0.0) 101.4769 102.7011 107.2225 112.6733 98.4722 102.7793 106.7845 92.6242 95.0194
(0.2,0.0) 101.4769 102.8649 107.7913 112.6733 99.6142 104.308 107.9235 96.4809 98.5502
(0.5,0.0) 101.4769 103.1107 108.6445 112.6733 101.3273 106.6011 109.6320 102.266 103.8464
(0.8,0.0) 101.4769 103.3565 109.4976 112.6733 103.0403 108.8941 111.3406 108.0511 109.1426
(1.0,0.0) 101.4769 103.5204 110.0664 112.6733 104.1824 110.4228 112.4796 111.9078 112.6734
(0.2,0.2) 101.4769 102.8691 107.7986 112.6733 99.6142 104.3136 107.9235 96.4809 98.5502
(0.5,0.2) 101.4769 103.1391 108.6922 112.6733 101.3273 106.6357 109.6320 102.266 103.8463
(0.8,0.2) 101.4769 103.4340 109.6270 112.6733 103.0403 108.9903 111.3406 108.0511 109.1429
(1.0,0.2) 101.4769 103.6474 110.2771 112.6733 104.1824 110.5760 112.4796 111.9078 112.6734
(0.2,0.5) 101.4769 102.8742 107.8068 112.6733 99.6142 104.3194 107.9235 96.4809 98.5501
(0.5,0.5) 101.4769 103.1797 108.7567 112.6733 101.3273 106.6841 109.6320 102.266 103.8463
(0.8,0.5) 101.4769 103.5741 109.8370 112.6733 103.0403 109.1472 111.3407 108.0511 109.1425
(1.0,0.5) 101.4769 103.9224 110.6742 112.6733 104.1824 110.8796 112.4797 111.9078 112.6737
(0.2,0.8) 101.4769 102.8773 107.8117 112.6733 99.6142 104.3232 107.9235 96.4809 98.5501
(0.5,0.8) 101.4769 103.2125 108.8047 112.6733 101.3273 106.7204 109.6322 102.266 103.8463
(0.8,0.8) 101.4769 103.7236 110.0638 112.6733 103.0403 109.3226 111.3407 108.0511 109.1425
(1.0,0.8) 101.4769 104.2366 111.3373 112.6733 104.1824 111.4217 112.4798 111.9078 112.6733
(0.2,1.0) 101.4769 102.8779 107.8126 112.6733 99.6142 104.3238 107.9235 96.4809 98.5501
(0.5,1.0) 101.4769 103.2217 108.8170 112.6733 101.3273 106.7298 109.6321 102.2660 103.8463
(0.8,1.0) 101.4769 103.7669 110.1648 112.6733 103.0403 109.4063 111.3382 108.0511 109.1425
(1.0,1.0) 101.4769 104.3767 112.1153 112.6733 104.1824 112.0841 112.6754 111.9078 112.6745
Table 1: Contract values from the insurer’s perspective for ρ ∈ {0,0.03,0.3}, ¯ ρ ∈
{0,0.03,0.3,∞}, p ∈ {0.0,0.2,0.5,0.8,1.0} and κ ∈ {0.0,02,0.5,0.8,1.0}.
between ˜ L and V C, so that the decision rule does not change with κ. This leads to the
fact that the contract value does not vary with κ when the secondary market exists. Third,
when (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,0.03),(0,0.3),(0.03,0.3), the contract value increases slightly with κ. The
reason can be interpreted from Figure 1. Since the ¯ ρ region increases with κ for given p,
the policyholder is more inclined to give up the contract when it is advantageous to do so.
With a certain probability, the contract would be sold to the secondary market. Moreover,
the shrink of the ρ region also contributes to the increase of the contract value. Thus, on
the whole, the contract value increases with κ.
To study the interaction of the policyholder’s monetary rationality with the secondary
market, we present in Table 2, for policyholders with diﬀerent monetary rationality degrees
(ρ, ¯ ρ), the relative deviation of the contract values when there is a secondary market from
the contract values when a secondary market does not exist. Comparing the columns for
(ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0.03,0.03),(0.03,0.3),(0.03,∞), we see that the impact of the secondary market
ﬁrst increases with the rise of the endogenous surrender intensity and then decreases with
it for given (p,κ) combinations. Since the relative deviation is 0 when (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,∞),
which we have not displayed in the table, the same pattern can also be observed for (ρ, ¯ ρ) =
(0,0.03),(0,0.3),(0,∞). This pattern is the joint work of the endogenous surrender intensity
¯ ρ and the margin from the secondary market (V Am−V ) where V refers to the contract value
25without the secondary market. Although the increase of ¯ ρ indicates that the policyholder is
more likely to surrender the contract to the secondary market when it is monetarily rational
to do so, the margin decreases when the policyholder is more capable of surrendering the
contract optimally by themselves. In which degree the contract value increases due to the
introduction of the secondary market depends on the change of ¯ ρ(V Am − V ) with ¯ ρ at
any time when the contract is likely to be surrendered endogenously by the policyholder
to either the insurer or the secondary market. With the increase of ¯ ρ, at the beginning,
its increase dominates the decrease of the margin (V Am −V ) so that the relative deviation
increases. When ¯ ρ further increases, its increase is dominated by the decrease of the margin.
This causes the decrease of the relative deviation. Diﬀerently, we observe the monotonic
increase of the relative deviation with the exogenous surrender intensity ρ when we compare
the columns with (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,0.3),(0.03,0.3),(0.3,0.3). A higher ρ indicates the lower
monetary rationality degree of the policyholder. Hence, the margin from the secondary
market increases. The double eﬀect, i.e., ρ(V Am − V ), leads to the increase of the relative








(0,0.03) (0,0.3) (0.03,0.03) (0.03,0.3) (0.03,∞) (0.3,0.3) (0.3,∞)
(0.2,0.0) 0.1595 0.5305 1.1597 1.4874 1.0666 4.1638 3.7159
(0.5,0.0) 0.3988 1.3262 2.8994 3.7185 2.6666 10.4096 9.2897
(0.8,0.0) 0.6382 2.1218 4.6390 5.9494 4.2666 16.6554 14.8635
(1.0,0.0) 0.7978 2.6523 5.7988 7.4368 5.3333 20.8192 18.5794
(0.2,0.2) 0.1636 0.5373 1.1597 1.4928 1.0666 4.1638 3.7159
(0.5,0.2) 0.4265 1.3707 2.8994 3.7521 2.6666 10.4096 9.2896
(0.8,0.2) 0.7136 2.2425 4.6390 6.0430 4.2666 16.6554 14.8638
(1.0,0.2) 0.9214 2.8488 5.7988 7.5859 5.3333 20.8192 18.5794
(0.2,0.5) 0.1685 0.5449 1.1597 1.4985 1.0666 4.1638 3.7158
(0.5,0.5) 0.4660 1.4309 2.8994 3.7992 2.6666 10.4096 9.2896
(0.8,0.5) 0.8500 2.4384 4.6390 6.1957 4.2667 16.6554 14.8634
(1.0,0.5) 1.1892 3.2192 5.7988 7.8813 5.3334 20.8192 18.5797
(0.2,0.8) 0.1716 0.5495 1.1597 1.5022 1.0666 4.1638 3.7158
(0.5,0.8) 0.4979 1.4756 2.8994 3.8345 2.6668 10.4096 9.2896
(0.8,0.8) 0.9956 2.6499 4.6390 6.3664 4.2667 16.6554 14.8634
(1.0,0.8) 1.4951 3.8376 5.7988 8.4087 5.3335 20.8192 18.5793
(0.2,1.0) 0.1722 0.5504 1.1597 1.5027 1.0666 4.1638 3.7158
(0.5,1.0) 0.5069 1.4871 2.8994 3.8437 2.6667 10.4096 9.2896
(0.8,1.0) 1.0378 2.7441 4.6390 6.4478 4.2644 16.6554 14.8634
(1.0,1.0) 1.6315 4.5632 5.7988 9.0532 5.5166 20.8192 18.5805
Table 2: Relative deviation (in %) of contract values with sec-
ondary market from contract values without secondary market for
(ρ, ¯ ρ) ∈ {(0,0.03),(0,0.3),(0.03,0.03),(0.03,0.3),(0.03,∞),(0.3,0.3),(0.3,∞)} from
insurer’s perspective.
265.2.3 Welfare Analysis for the Policyholder
In this section we study the eﬀect of secondary market for the representative policyholder.
In Table 3 we present the contract values from the policyholder’s perspective. We compare
the values when the secondary market exists and when it does not. Similar to Table 1,
we do not observe its eﬀect when (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,0),(0,∞). When κ = 0, all the proﬁts are
transferred to the contract buyer. The policyholder is in principle indiﬀerent, whether to
sell the contract back to the insurer or to the contract buyer on the secondary market. His
welfare increases when both p and κ are diﬀerent from 0. As is indicated in Proposition 1,
it is p×κ that determines the contract value for the policyholder. Hence, we see in Table 3
that the contract values are identical for the (p,κ) combinations with the same p×κ value
and the same degree of monetary rationality. The higher p×κ is, the higher is the increase
in the welfare of the policyholder which is brought by the secondary market.
Furthermore, to study the interaction of policyholder’s monetary rationality with the
(p,κ) combinations and its eﬀect on the welfare of the representative policyholder, we
present in Table 4 the relative deviation of the contract values when there is secondary
market from the values when there is no secondary market. We observe the same pattern
as is demonstrated in Table 2, i.e., the relative deviation increases ﬁrst with ¯ ρ and then
decreases with it for ¯ ρ ∈ {0.03,0.3,∞}, and the relative deviation increases monotonically
with ρ. The reason for this phenomenon is the same as is analyzed in Section 5.2.2.
Now we compare Tables 1 and 3. When κ = 1.0, the policyholder obtains all the proﬁts
generated by the secondary market. There is no diﬀerence between the contract values from
the insurer’s and the policyholder’s perspectives. Moreover, since the secondary market has
no eﬀect for (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,0),(0,∞), we do not see the diﬀerence in these cases either. In the
other cases, we observe that the true contract values for the policyholder are always lower
than the values for the insurer, because the proﬁts generated by the secondary market are
shared with contract buyer. Besides, the diﬀerence between them are higher for higher p.
This is because higher p indicates that the policyholder is more likely to go to the secondary
market and more proﬁts are to be generated by the secondary market due to its competence
to exercise the surrender option optimally. On the contrary, the diﬀerence between the two
values shrinks with the increase of the κ since the beneﬁts obtained by the policyholder is
closer to premium charged by the insurer for higher κ. Through this comparison, we see that
27the introduction of the secondary market is not necessarily proﬁtable to the policyholder
if the increase of the welfare is associated with the increase of the premium. If the insurer
takes the secondary market into account when calculating the premium, then the secondary
market is only desirable for the representative policyholder when it is very competitive.
We know that the policyholder actually represents a large pool of policyholders. The
surrender behavior of the representative policyholder summarizes the average behavior of
the pool of policyholders. Within this pool, some policyholders are more informed of the
existence of the secondary market than the others. Even when the secondary market is not
competitive enough and the insurer charges a higher premium, those policyholders who are
better informed may beneﬁt from the secondary market and those who are less informed
may bear the costs caused by the secondary market. Now we study which policyholders are
really proﬁting from the secondary market.
We assume there are two types of policyholders. 50% of the policyholders are of type 1
and they have no access to the secondary market. The other 50% are of type 2, who have
full access to the secondary market. This indicates that p = 0.5. Moreover, we assume that
the policyholders of the two types have on average the same degree of monetary rationality,
namely, (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0.03,0.3). We look at the secondary markets with diﬀerent degrees of
competitiveness, κ = 0,0.2,0.5,1.0. Since the secondary market is irrelevant for the type 1
policyholders, the contract value for this policyholder type is the same for diﬀerent κ values,
namely, 102.7793. When κ = 0, the contract value for the type 2 policyholders is 102.7793.
However, if the insurer takes it into account that some policyholders will go to the secondary
market, the premium could be 106.6011, see the {(p,κ),(ρ, ¯ ρ)} = {(0.5,0.0),(0.03,0.3)}
entry in Table 1. The secondary market harms both types of policyholders. When κ = 0.2,
the contract value for the type 2 policyholders is 104.3238, while the insurer may calculate
the premium as 106.6357. Thus, on the secondary market with little competitiveness, no
policyholders beneﬁt from it either. When κ = 0.5, the type 2 policyholders beneﬁt from
the secondary market. Not only does their welfare increases from 102.7793 to 106.7298,
but also they may pay lower premium than the welfare they have gained, i.e., 106.6841.
The type 1 policyholders bear the costs incurred by the secondary market. At last, when
κ = 1.0, it is still the type 1 policyholders who pay more premium to eliminate the higher








(0,0) (0,0.03) (0,0.3) (0,∞) (0.03,0.03) (0.03,0.3) (0.03,∞) (0.3,0.3) (0.3,∞)
(0.0,0.0) 101.4769 102.7011 107.2225 112.6733 98.4722 102.7793 106.7845 92.6242 95.0194
(0.2,0.0) 101.4769 102.7011 107.2225 112.6733 98.4722 102.7793 106.7845 92.6242 95.0194
(0.5,0.0) 101.4769 102.7011 107.2225 112.6733 98.4722 102.7793 106.7845 92.6242 95.0194
(0.8,0.0) 101.4769 102.7011 107.2225 112.6733 98.4722 102.7793 106.7845 92.6242 95.0194
(1.0,0.0) 101.4769 102.7011 107.2225 112.6733 98.4722 102.7793 106.7845 92.6242 95.0194
(0.2,0.2) 101.4769 102.7343 107.3369 112.6733 98.7006 103.0855 107.0123 93.3955 95.7255
(0.5,0.2) 101.4769 102.7859 107.5117 112.6733 99.0432 103.5472 107.3540 94.5526 96.7847
(0.8,0.2) 101.4769 102.8402 107.6907 112.6733 99.3858 104.0120 107.6957 95.7096 97.844
(1.0,0.2) 101.4769 102.8779 107.8126 112.6733 99.6142 104.3238 107.9235 96.4809 98.5501
(0.2,0.5) 101.4769 102.7859 107.5117 112.6733 99.0432 103.5472 107.3540 94.5526 96.7847
(0.5,0.5) 101.4769 102.9271 107.9681 112.6733 99.8997 104.7159 108.2082 97.4451 99.4328
(0.8,0.5) 101.4769 103.0919 108.4606 112.6733 100.7563 105.9115 109.0627 100.3376 102.0809
(1.0,0.5) 101.4769 103.2217 108.8170 112.6733 101.3273 106.7298 109.6321 102.266 103.8463
(0.2,0.8) 101.4769 102.8402 107.6907 112.6733 99.3858 104.0120 107.6957 95.7096 97.8440
(0.5,0.8) 101.4769 103.0919 108.4606 112.6733 100.7563 105.9115 109.0627 100.3376 102.0809
(0.8,0.8) 101.4769 103.4418 109.3737 112.6733 102.1267 107.9202 110.4294 104.9657 106.3179
(1.0,0.8) 101.4769 103.7669 110.1648 112.6733 103.0403 109.4063 111.3382 108.0511 109.1425
(0.2,1.0) 101.4769 102.8779 107.8126 112.6733 99.6142 104.3238 107.9235 96.4809 98.5501
(0.5,1.0) 101.4769 103.2217 108.8170 112.6733 101.3273 106.7298 109.6321 102.266 103.8463
(0.8,1.0) 101.4769 103.7669 110.1648 112.6733 103.0403 109.4063 111.3382 108.0511 109.1425
(1.0,1.0) 101.4769 104.3767 112.1153 112.6733 104.1824 112.0841 112.6724 111.9078 112.6715
Table 3: Contract values for ρ ∈ {0,0.03,0.3}, ¯ ρ ∈ {0,0.03,0.3,∞}, p ∈
{0.0,0.2,0.5,0.8,1.0} and κ ∈ {0.0,02,0.5,0.8,1.0} from the policyholder’s perspective
5.2.4 Fair Contract Analysis
In Proposition 3, we have presented the necessary condition for the existence of a fair
contract. When p = 0, it is actually equivalent to the absence of a secondary market.
When (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0,∞), the policyholder is assumed to be fully monetarily rational, which
is hardly true in reality. The remaining necessary condition requires that the secondary
market develops to a completely competitive market, i.e., κ = 1, so that a fair contract
exists.
In this section, we conduct a brief fair contract analysis under the assumption that
the secondary market is completely competitive. Furthermore, the policyholder’s monetary
rationality is supposed to satisfy (ρ, ¯ ρ) = (0.03,0.3), and the access possibility to the sec-
ondary market is p = 0.5. We study how the participation coeﬃcient k should be modiﬁed,
so that the contract issued is fair. Alternatively, other parameters could be adjusted in the
similar way when keeping k constant and are hence not analyzed here.
In the case without a secondary market for the analyzed insurance contract, the con-







(0,0.03) (0,0.3) (0.03,0.03) (0.03,0.3) (0.03,∞) (0.3,0.3) (0.3,∞)
(0.2,0.2) 0.0323 0.1067 0.2319 0.2979 0.2133 0.8327 0.7431
(0.5,0.2) 0.0826 0.2697 0.5799 0.7471 0.5333 2.0820 1.8578
(0.8,0.2) 0.1354 0.4367 0.9278 1.1994 0.8533 3.3311 2.9727
(1.0,0.2) 0.1722 0.5504 1.1597 1.5027 1.0666 4.1638 3.7158
(0.2,0.5) 0.0826 0.2697 0.5799 0.7471 0.5333 2.0820 1.8578
(0.5,0.5) 0.2201 0.6954 1.4496 1.8842 1.3332 5.2048 4.6447
(0.8,0.5) 0.3805 1.1547 2.3195 3.0475 2.1335 8.3276 7.4316
(1.0,0.5) 0.5069 1.4871 2.8994 3.8437 2.6667 10.4096 9.2896
(0.2,0.8) 0.1354 0.4367 0.9278 1.1994 0.8533 3.3311 2.9727
(0.5,0.8) 0.3805 1.1547 2.3195 3.0475 2.1335 8.3276 7.4316
(0.8,0.8) 0.7212 2.0063 3.7112 5.0019 3.4133 13.3243 11.8907
(1.0,0.8) 1.0378 2.7441 4.6390 6.4478 4.2644 16.6554 14.8634
(0.2,1.0) 0.1722 0.5504 1.1597 1.5027 1.0666 4.1638 3.7158
(0.5,1.0) 0.5069 1.4871 2.8994 3.8437 2.6667 10.4096 9.2896
(0.8,1.0) 1.0378 2.7441 4.6390 6.4478 4.2644 16.6554 14.8634
(1.0,1.0) 1.6315 4.5632 5.7988 9.0532 5.5166 20.8192 18.5805
Table 4: Relative deviation (in %) of contract values with sec-
ondary market from contract values without secondary market for
(ρ, ¯ ρ) ∈ {(0,0.03),(0,0.3),(0.03,0.03),(0.03,0.3),(0.03,∞),(0.3,0.3),(0.3,∞)} from
policyholder’s perspective.
competitive, the contract is at par for k = 0.72552 which is about 11.5% lower than the
k value in the former case. The lower participation coeﬃcient helps to oﬀset the proﬁts
generated from the secondary market and earned by the policyholder. Similar to our anal-
ysis in section 5.2.3, we now generalize from the representative policyholder to two groups
of policyholders and see which group is hurt by the secondary market. Policyholders of
group 1 have no information about the secondary market and policyholders of group 2 have
knowledge about it. The fair participation coeﬃcient k for group 1 is k = 0.8196 and for
group 2 is k = 0.6348. Thus, group 1 is worse oﬀ for not being able to participate fairly in
the return of the underlying assets. While group 2 is better oﬀ for proﬁting not only from
the secondary market but also from the policyholders of group 1.
In this paper we have focused more on the eﬀect of the secondary market on the poli-
cyholders with average monetary rationality. If we further generalize from the two groups
of policyholders with diﬀerent information about the secondary market to more groups of
policyholders with diﬀerent degrees of monetary rationality as well, we would ﬁnd that
the policyholders with the highest rationality and the full information about the secondary
market proﬁt the most from the secondary market. A comprehensive fair contract analysis
concerning diﬀerent degrees of monetary rationality is provided by Li and Szimayer [26].
Their analysis can be easily extended to our setting with secondary market and is hence
omitted here.
306 Conclusion
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper which includes a secondary market in the valuation
of equity-linked life insurance contracts with surrender guarantees. We have analyzed the
eﬀect of a secondary market within an intensity based framework where the surrender
intensity of the policyholder is assumed to be bounded from below and from above. The
access to the secondary market is modeled by randomization.
We have shown that the surrender behavior of the representative policyholder is aﬀected
by the secondary market. The existence of a secondary market increases the likelihood that
the policyholder sells his contract either back to the insurer or to the secondary market when
it is ﬁnancially optimal to do so. Besides, the likelihood of surrendering in disadvantageous
situations decreases, where we need to keep it in mind that with a certain possibility the
secondary market will take over the contract. On the whole, the risk borne by the insurer
increases due to the introduction of the secondary market and it increases further with the
growth of the secondary market.
With the existence of a secondary market, the contract values from the insurer’s perspec-
tive are usually not identical with the values from a representative policyholder’s point of
view. We have derived two pricing PDEs and Feynman-Kac type stochastic representations
to characterize the contract values from the two perspectives. Comparative statics as well
as our numerical analysis have shown that the contract value for the representative policy-
holder increases with the product of the access probability to the secondary market p and
the competitiveness indicator κ. For the insurer, the contract value increases monotonically
with the access probability p but not always with κ. This is because the insurer takes into
account during the contract valuation that the contract buyers on the secondary market
have the expertise to exercise the surrender option ﬁnancially rational and κ inﬂuences the
contract value from the insurer’s perspective only through the surrender behavior modeled
in equation (7).
We have also investigated the interaction of the policyholder’s monetary rationality
with the secondary market. Numerical results have shown that higher endogenous surren-
der intensity decreases the margin generated by the secondary market and thus does not
necessarily increase the impact of the secondary market on contract values. On the con-
31trary, higher exogenous surrender intensity increases the margin and hence enhances the
eﬀect of the secondary market.
Since the policyholder may only proﬁt partly from the high rationality of the contract
buyers on the secondary market, the contract values from the policyholder’s perspective
are usually lower than the values from the policyholder’s perspective. Hence, although the
introduction of the secondary market may increase the payout to the policyholder, it is not
necessarily beneﬁcial for him if the welfare increase is associated with the increase of the
premium. Generalizing from the representative policyholder to two groups of policyholders,
one uninformed and one informed of the existence of the secondary market, we have demon-
strated that the secondary market is proﬁtable for no policyholders when the policyholders
have not bargaining power on the secondary market. If, on the contrary, the secondary
market is competitive enough, the informed policyholders proﬁt from the secondary market
while the uninformed policyholders bear the costs incurred by it.
Only in special cases would the contract values from the two perspectives be identical.
One of the special cases is κ = 1, i.e., the secondary market is completely competitive.
Under this assumption, we have conducted the fair contract analysis. We have compared
the contract parameters when the the secondary market exists and when it does not, and
hence highlighted the inﬂuence of a secondary market on contract design.
The secondary market brings a challenge to the insurance companies in regard to the
risk management of the contracts. Insurance contracts usually have long maturity time and
may already have existed before the insurance companies’ awareness about the emergence
of the secondary market. If the secondary market is introduced at a sudden, the premiums
charged before may not be adequate to support the hedging strategies of the insurance com-
panies. In particular, although the policyholders may not rush to surrender their contracts
simultaneously, the contract buyers on the secondary market may be able to do so due to
their expertise in managing the contracts. Hence, once the secondary market comes into
play, the insurance companies have to deal with the potential liquidity problem caused by
the simultaneous surrender of the contracts.
32A Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Suppose V satisﬁes the PDE (15) with the given boundary condition v(T,ST) =
Φ(ST), and deﬁne the process X via
dXs = a(t,s)X(s)dt + σ(t,s)X(s)dW(s).











































t r(y)+µ(y)+γ(y,X(y))dyµ(u)Ψ(u,X(u)) + γ(u,X(u))L(u) + pκ(V
Am(u,X(u)) − L(u)),



























































Applying expectations to this equation ﬁnally yields, assuming suﬃcient integrability,
E

































which is the required stochastic representation formula of the Feynman-Kac type and thus
the proof is completed.
34B A Martingale Approach to Corollary 1
This appendix proves Corollary 1 using a martingale approach. Based on the model setup
provided in Section 2, the time t value of an alive contract, i.e., t < λ ∧ τ ∧ T, from the
















































Proposition 6. Suppose the setup detailed in Section 2 and Section 3, the value process
V C




























































Proof. For the ﬁrst three terms, Proposition 3 in Li and Szimayer [26] is applicable. Thus,
the only remaining term that requires proof is term four. For that, we have precisely the
same steps as for part 3 in Li and Szimayer, but with a modiﬁed payment. This is due to
the nature of the decision to access the secondary market. It only inﬂuences the payment
received once the contract is surrendered, but it does not aﬀect the probabilities to get to
time where this is relevant. Neither the ﬂow of information modeled by the σ-algebras nor
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Here, Corollary 5.1.1 of Bielecki and Rutkowski [6], equation (5.13) has been applied. We
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Changing the order of integration again (Fubini’s theorem) results in
1{λ>t}1{τ>t}E
Q
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.
This proofs the result, as both indicator functions are always equal to one because the
function is only analyzed on {t < λ ∧ τ ∧ T}.
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